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‘For the rational study of the law … the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down … and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past’ ~  
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 469. 
 
 
In this chapter, I aim to reflect on the topic of ‘lay decision-making in the legal system’ from the 
perspective of the economic analysis of law. Or, in other words, I attempt to look at the ways in which 
economic theory and insight can help resolve issues of legal decision-making by providing both a 
methodology for the analysis of the legal reality to which the decision relates (that is, contributing to 
the decision-making process by structuring it and helping us focus on relevant factors), and a 
normative framework and workable criteria to favour some alternatives over others (i.e. providing a 
decision-making benchmark). Broadly, then, I am concerned with the question of how can economic 
analysis help us improve legal decision-making generally. After this broad discussion, which is 
confessedly superficial, and in order to stress the link with the rest of the contributions to this book, I 
briefly focus on the potential application of some of these theories to research that aims to assess 
specific issues of lay decision-making in the legal system. Some final thoughts stress the importance 
of carrying out economically-informed legal research more generally. 
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Prof Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real, Pierluigi Cuccuru, Prof Francisco Marcos Fernández, Dr Jule Mulder and Dr 
Sebastian Peyer for their comments to an earlier draft. The standard disclaimer applies. 
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Introduction 
The economic analysis of law (also generally known as law and economics)1 is probably the dominant 
legal methodology in US scholarship, and one that is slowly growing in importance in Europe,2 
although it is still a far from mainstream methodology in most EU and UK law schools.3 As aptly put, 
it ‘uses economic theory to analyse the legal world. It examines that world from the standpoint of 
economic theory and, as a result of that examination, confirms, casts doubt upon, and often seeks 
reform of legal reality’.4 Or, in even clearer terms, the ‘Economic analysis of law seeks to answer two 
basic questions about legal rules. Namely, what are the effects of legal rules on the behaviour of 
relevant actors? And are these effects of legal rules socially desirable?’.5 Therefore, the economic 
analysis of law serves two main purposes. First, it helps describe and explain how the law is and what 
effects it creates or can be expected to create (positive dimension). Second, it provides a framework 
for critical analysis and an ultimate view of how the law ought to be (designed, reformed, interpreted 
or enforced) for it to achieve specific goals that are socially desirable (normative dimension). Both 
functions can be controversial, but the normative dimension of the economic analysis of law—which 
ultimately rests on the pursuit of economic efficiency as a proxy for the maximization of social 
welfare,6 as discussed below—has probably been its most debated aspect, and one that has triggered 
significant resistance and even full-on rejection of this methodology. One extreme line of criticism 
                                                          
1 In this chapter, I use the expressions law and economics and economic analysis of law interchangeably. 
However, distinguished scholars have made important attempts to establish differences between the two; see e.g. 
G Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics: Essays in Reform and Recollection (Yale University Press, 
2016). I do not ignore their work, but the discussion here remains at a level of generality where such distinctions 
are not needed. 
2 Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S Ulen, ‘The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the 
United States’ (2007-2008) 59 Alabama Law Review 1555-1633. 
3 For discussion on current developments on legal methodology, see Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz and 
Miguel Poiares Maduro, Methodology in the New Legal World (2012) EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/13 
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/22016/LAW_2012_13_VanGestelMicklitzMaduro.pdf 
(last accessed 20 June 2016); and Rob van Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Why Methods Matter in European 
Legal Scholarship’ (2014) 20(3) European Law Journal 292-316. 
4 Calabresi (n 1) 2. For a distinction with what he calls law and economics, see ibid 3-4. As Calabresi explains, 
this largely matches behavioural law and economics, which is not discussed in detail in this chapter. 
5 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Economic Analysis of Law’, in Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (eds), 
Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 3 (Elsevier, 2002) 1661-1784, 1661. 
6 Peter Bohm, Social Efficiency: A Concise Introduction to Welfare Economics, 2nd edn (Macmillan, 1987). 
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has even relied on the claim that law and economics may be immoral.7 These issues may create a 
smoke screen allowing critics to dismiss the economic analysis of law too quickly as either a 
neoliberal market-making endeavour, or a methodology only relevant in very limited aspects of 
commercial or market-based legal sub-fields. My submission is that this is simply not the case and 
that the economic analysis of law is a fundamental tool with which to try to ensure that the legal 
system is both effective in achieving its goals (which are by no means predetermined by the law and 
economics approach), and efficient in doing so (that is, it achieves those goals in the way that makes 
most members of society better off, which is what the concept of efficiency as a proxy for social 
welfare ultimately encapsulates). This submission relies on a number of implicit assumptions, which I 
will try to unpack later. 
It is worth stressing that the economic analysis of law rests on the work of some giants of economic 
and legal thought,8 a good number of which were awarded Nobel Prizes in Economics. It is hard to 
make justice to their work when one tries to strip their theories from technical complication and to 
present their insights in an accessible way.9 Thus, I do not aim to present the several technical 
approaches broadly comprised within the economic analysis of law methodology in a thorough and 
detailed manner, but I will much rather only try to explain the usefulness of incorporating economic 
insights into legal analysis and scholarship, in what I like to call economically-informed legal 
research. To push the argument, I am convinced that carrying out legal research without assessing its 
economic implications and without incorporating the insights of economic theory is ultimately 
                                                          
7 For discussion, see Robin P Malloy and J Evensky (eds), Adam Smith and the Philosophy of Law and 
Economics (Kluwer, 1994), and Aristides N Hatzis and Nicholas Mercuro (eds), Law and Economics: 
Philosophical Issues and Fundamental Questions, The Economics of Legal Relationships (Routledge, 2015). 
For an advanced analysis, see Walter J Schultz, The Moral Conditions of Economic Efficiency, Cambridge 
Studies in Philosophy and Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
8 It is impossible to cover even just the seminal contributions to the development of this field in a basic 
discussion such as the one in this chapter, as the relevant authors include distinguished scholars such as Arrow, 
Becker, Buchanan, Calabresi, Coase, Friedman, Nash, Posner or Stigler. Any enumeration is however bound to 
be unfair due to its incompleteness. For clear points of reference in the existing literature, see Richard Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, 9th edn (Wolters Kluwer, 2014) and Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2004); as well as the standard handbook by Robert B Cooter Jr and 
Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th edn (Pearson, 2012). For a simpler introduction, see A Mitchell 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 4th edn (Aspen, 2011). 
9 For an excellent and successful attempt to provide such accessible introduction, see Emanuel V Towfigh and 
Niels Petersen (eds), Economic Methods for Lawyers (Edward Elgar, 2015). For a thought-provoking introduction, 
see J Leitzel, Concepts in Law and Economics. A Guide for the Curious (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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unsatisfactory, just as it is equally faulty not to incorporate the insights derived from political science 
and other social sciences such as sociology or anthropology, or even beyond, from evolutionary 
theory and psychology. This is not to say that strict doctrinal legal research has no place in modern 
academia or that it lacks value,10 but rather a call for legal scholars to broaden their views and – once 
their analyses are legally technically sound from a legal perspective – to consider them in their 
relevant context, in particular from an economic perspective, as a matter of analytical completeness.11 
Law is not, and probably has never been an independent field of study. When it was claimed it was, a 
deeper analysis would show that law scholars were making philosophical or even theological – 
dogmatic – analysis of normative statements or social norms settled down in a text.12 Even further 
legal studies can hardly be considered free from normative implications.13 Thus, doctrinal legal 
research may (simply) differ from other approaches in presenting itself as aseptic and not being 
explicit about the social and economic normative assumptions that underlie any specific piece of 
analysis. If that is true, then, it seems preferable to be sincere and avoid masking and passing as 
‘technical’ evaluative issues that are fundamentally normative. I will also try to explain this in more 
detail later. 
I will not cover all aspects of the economic analysis of law and, in particular, I will not discuss in 
detail its main criticisms and the emergence of behavioural law and economics or an economic 
analysis of law 2.0.14 Focusing strictly on ‘classic’ economic analysis of law (law and economics 1.0, 
                                                          
10 This is linked to the discussion on whether ‘doctrinal legal research is dead’ in which Eric Posner and Richard 
Posner, amongst others, engaged. For discussion, see the contribution by Hutchinson to this book. 
11 Similarly, Douglas G Baird stressed that ‘As long as legal scholars have to worry about the consequences that 
a new law brings, we shall call upon the tools of law and economics’; in ‘The Future of Law and Economics: 
Essays by Ten Law School Scholars’ (2011) The Record, available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall11/lawandecon-future (last accessed 25 May 2016). 
12 For extended discussion, see Tara Smith, ‘Neutrality Isn’t Neutral: On the Value-Neutrality of the Rule of 
Law’ (2011) 4(1) Washington University Jurisprudence Review 49, available at 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/3 (last accessed 20 June 2016). 
13 Cf. Andrei Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 683-704. See also Reza Banakar, ‘Can Legal Sociology Account for the Normativity of Law?’ in 
M Baier and K Åström (eds), Social and Legal Norms (Ashgate, 2012). See also Kenneth M Ehrenberg, 
‘Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law’ (2009) 29(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
91; and Richard L Abel, ‘Redirecting Social Studies of Law’ (1980) 14(3) Law and Society Review 805. 
14 For discussion, see the special issue of the University of Chicago Law School Alumni Magazine The Record 
in the fall of 2011, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall11/lawandecon2-0 (last 
accessed 25 May 2016). 
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or ‘primitive’ law and economics)15 is simply justified by the need to provide a clear account of what 
this methodological approach can and cannot do, and to avoid any misrepresentation of the very 
powerful analytical tools it offers, even when the criticisms are considered—or, discounted, if you 
wish. Consequently, all the discussion in this chapter will revolve around the basic understanding of 
law as an institution aimed at regulating the behaviour of the economic man (or homo economicus),16 
without engaging in any level of detail with the theories that challenge this conception or seek to 
refine it.17  
The importance of the homo economicus for the economic analysis of law 
In very general terms, it can be said that the economic analysis of law focuses on the study of how 
changes in the law alter the way people behave, which requires a characterisation of human 
behaviour. Economic analysis is based on rational choice theory, which ultimately rests on the 
assumption that humans are rational beings who behave accordingly. Thus, the economic analysis of 
law revolves around the model of the economic man (or homo economicus).18 This means that, for the 
purposes of predicting or analysing the behaviour that will result from specific legal rules or reforms, 
the economic analysis of law assumes that we make decisions based on our assessment of the utility 
we can obtain from the different options19 and that, rationally, we will choose the option that 
maximises our utility (or, in other words, that we are self-interested). This general assumption leads 
us to e.g. expect people to have an incentive to breach a contract if they can obtain a benefit from non-
compliance (for instance, the seller has incentives to walk away from a contractual commitment and 
hand over the goods to a higher bidder); or expect them to be more deterred from committing crimes 
                                                          
15 Cynthia A Williams, ‘A Tale of Two Trajectories’ (2006) 75(3) Fordham Law Review 1629, 1657, available 
at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss3/21 (last accessed 20 June 2016). 
16 At this level of generality, the potential connections with socio-legal studies are probably quite apparent, 
particularly if socio-legal studies are conceptualised in broad terms and the fact that economics is a social 
science is given proper weight. However, the economic analysis of law is usually not included amongst the 
garden variety of socio-legal approaches, at least in UK academia. 
17 See Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ 
(1998) 50(5) Stanford Law Review 1471-1550. 
18 For discussion, see Harold Demsetz, ‘Where Economic Man Dwells’, in From Economic Man to Economic 
System: Essays on Human Behavior and the Institutions of Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
19 In simple terms, utility is meant to capture the value or the advantage that derives from a given option, which 
can make it desirable. Or, in other words, it encapsulates ‘the capacity of a good or service to satisfy a want, of 
whatever kind’. For discussion, see R D Collison Black, ‘Utility’, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter 
Newman (eds), Utility and Probability (Palgrave, 1990) 295-302. 
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the higher the sanction and/or the likelihood of being caught and convicted; or to pursue their own 
individual interests if the negative consequences of a given behaviour fall upon somebody else’s 
shoulders (such as slacking at work if the employer cannot monitor effort, or reducing the level of 
precaution when carrying out insured activities if the insurer cannot detect changes in diligence). 
This characterisation of human behaviour as rational allows for the formulation of economic models 
that can explain the behaviour (as a result of the incentive structure that underlies the expressed 
rational choice) and, more importantly, aim to predict it (especially in view of changes in the structure 
of incentives). This is particularly relevant because most legal rules aim at preventing types of 
behaviour that are considered undesirable, either from a social perspective (e.g. criminal activity) or 
within the framework of private relationships (such as breaching contracts, causing damages to 
innocent parties or deceiving trustful partners). It is also useful because sometimes the behaviour that 
can be considered privately undesirable may simultaneously be socially desirable, or the opposite. A 
clear example arises in the area of environmental law, where private parties have rational incentives to 
minimise their costs (for instance, by acquiring goods or services from highly polluting sources if they 
are cheaper than environmentally-friendly alternatives), despite the fact that this can impose a higher 
ecological cost on society at large, which is socially undesirable.20 Conversely, an absolute avoidance 
of any ecological costs could be socially undesirable if it led to the prevention of economic activity 
that, overall, could be socially beneficial in terms of generation of employment or the production of 
necessary goods or services. The economic analysis of law can offer valuable tools that help decision-
makers reach a balance of interests that maximizes social welfare in the long-run (or at least tends to 
it). Furthermore, it is also relevant because sometimes there will be different ways of promoting the 
same private behaviour, but they will come at different social costs (such as the difference in costs 
between raising sanctions and increasing investigative capacity, e.g. for the prevention of tax fraud, 
towards which either option should contribute, as discussed in more detail below).21 In those 
                                                          
20 This relates to the concept of externality, which is a key element of analysis linked to market failure in the so 
called tragedy of the commons. See James M Buchanan and William C Stubblebine, ‘Externality’, in Chennat 
Gopalakrishnan (ed), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics (Palgrave, 2000) 138-154; and Elinor 
Ostrom, ‘Tragedy of the commons’, in Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume (eds), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn (2008). 
21 George J Stigler, ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’ (1970) 78(3) Journal of Political Economy 526-536. 
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circumstances, being able to compare options from a social welfare perspective will be important for 
decision-makers. 
As these basic examples show, the main analytical advantage that the economic analysis of law offers 
is that, by working on the basis of a characterisation of human behaviour that closely resembles 
reality (at least in most settings or in terms of average expected behaviour), it allows for rather 
accurate predictions of how changes in legal rules can alter that behaviour so as to promote socially 
desirable outcomes, as well as to allow the design of private relationships in ways that best serve the 
interests of the parties involved.22 The models and the examples do not aim to replicate reality in a 
perfect way (which would not be possible), but rather to create a workable framework for analysis.23 
In the end, this characterisation of behaviour allows us to identify the incentives created by legal rules 
and, on that basis, to predict the likely behaviour of those subjected to the rules. The immediate 
implication is that, should the expected behaviour not be the desired one, the same economic analysis 
of law allows us to design counter-incentives and to assess (both theoretically and empirically) if they 
are superior in promoting the desired behaviour. All of this ultimately rests on the need to determine 
what behaviour is desirable, which the economic analysis of law answers by clearly indicating that 
behaviour will be desirable if it fosters social welfare in the long run. This normative bedrock of the 
economic analysis of law also deserves further discussion. 
Why is this all about efficiency, what about redistribution or fairness? 
The economic analysis of law rests on the position that behaviour will be desirable if it promotes 
social welfare in the long run. Or, in other words, behaviour will be desirable if it is economically 
efficient. This proposition triggers two issues. First, how to determine what is economically efficient 
behaviour and, second, why are alternative goals, such as redistribution of wealth or fairness, not used 
as the normative benchmark for analysis. 
                                                          
22 Gregory Mitchell, ‘Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law 
and Economics’ Equal Incompetence’ (2002) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 67. 
23 For discussion, see Muireann Quigley and Elen Stokes, ‘Nudging and Evidence-Based Policy in Europe: 
Problems of Normative Legitimacy and Effectiveness’, in Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), 
Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective, Modern Studies in European Law (Hart, 2015) 61, 75 and ff. 
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The first question is relatively easier to answer on the basis of the theoretical work of welfare 
economists. In strict terms, a situation (or legal rule) will be efficient—i.e. will create the highest 
possible level of social welfare—if it is not possible to modify it in a way that makes some individuals 
better off without making anyone worse off or, in other words, a situation will only be efficient if it 
generates advantages to some to the prejudice of none. This strict approach to efficiency is known as 
Pareto efficiency.24 The difficulty with this strict approach is that it would make legal reform almost 
impossible, in particular if changes to legal rules (e.g. increases in taxation) would negatively affect 
the rights or legal position of any individual (in the example, that is inescapable because someone 
would bear the burden of the higher taxes). This makes the strict criterion of Pareto efficiency 
vulnerable to the criticism that it consolidates existing inequalities and that it prevents legal reform 
that is socially desirable in a broader sense. 
To tackle this issue, a refined concept of efficiency was developed by Kaldor and Hicks.25 Under 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, there is no increase in economic welfare unless, as a result of the 
implementation of a given rule or policy, those who gain would in principle be able to compensate 
fully those who lose and still be better off themselves—that is, unless there is a net social gain of 
economic welfare.26 Using the same example, increases in taxation can be considered efficient under 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion even if some members of society are worse off due to the higher taxation, 
provided that the benefits derived from the increased public revenue by those that are on the receiving 
end (e.g. recipients of social benefits or users of the public healthcare system) derive a larger 
advantage, even if there is no actual compensation between these different social groups. This is the 
concept of social welfare that forms the basis of the (mainstream) economic analysis of law 
methodology. 
                                                          
24 See Vilfredo Pareto, Manuale di economia politica con una introduzione alla scienza sociale (Società Editrice 
Libraria, 1906, repr 1919). 
25 See Nicholas Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 49 The 
Economic Journal 549-552, and John R Hicks, ‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics’ (1939) 49The 
Economic Journal 696-712. The seminal ideas behind this approach were advanced by AC Pigou, The 
Economics of Welfare, 4th edn (London, MacMillan, 1932). 
26 On the desirability of this normative criterion, see Richard Posner, ‘Ethical and Political Basis of the 
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication’ (1980) 8(3) Hofstra Law Review 487; and Jules L Coleman, 
‘Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization’ (1980) 8(3) Hofstra Law Review 509. 
9 
A close look at the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency makes it clear that the analysis under welfare 
economics is not concerned with whether compensation or redistribution is actually achieved by a 
given rule or legal reform, but it simply focuses on whether that would be possible in economic terms. 
It also does not express or indicate any preference about who should benefit from the net economic 
efficiency derived from the legal situation or reform. In that regard, a legal reform whereby the richest 
in society benefit sufficiently to potentially compensate the poorest that suffer the detriment derived 
from that legal reform is as desirable as the opposite development, provided both scenarios create the 
same absolute amount of social welfare. Thus, inequality and its potential increase is not captured by 
the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. This has been another focus of criticism of the economic 
analysis of law, and critics have raised the stylised argument that legal scholarship should be 
concerned with redistribution and equality or, more generally, with fairness (or justice).27 Looking 
forward, this is a criticism bound to carry some additional weight in view of the increasing discussion 
about the impact of inequality in terms of economic development.28 However, it is important to stress 
that economic analysis of law scholars do not necessarily dismiss those concerns in the abstract or in 
absolute terms. Rather, the consensus is that equality-oriented interventions should be left to specific 
areas of law and policy specifically designed around the issue of wealth (re)distribution (such as 
taxation and welfare law), whereas the rest of the legal system (and in particular private law) should 
not be driven by redistributive considerations because doing so makes the economic analysis either 
skewed or impossible.29 The same applies to arguments of fairness, which are simply impossible to 
tackle using economic methods.30 Overall, then, a possible way to conceptualise this is simply to 
                                                          
27 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Law-and-economics from the perspective of critical legal studies’, in John Eatwell, 
Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (eds), New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1st edn (1987) 465-474. 
28 See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, 2014) and the debate it 
has sparked in economic literature and beyond. See also Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and 
the Origins of Inequality (Princeton University Press, 2013). 
29 For extended discussion, see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Welfare versus Fairness (Harvard University 
Press, 2002) and David A Weisbach ‘Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?’ (2003) 70 
University of Chicago Law Review 439. For a criticism of this line of thought, see C Sanchirico, ‘Taxes versus 
Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 797; and 
ibid, ‘Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale’ (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 1003. 
30 The difficulty of using other evaluative criteria, such as fairness, was stressed by GJ Stigler, ‘The Law and 
Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars’ (1972) 1 Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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understand that the economic analysis of law ultimately aims at finding ways of making the pie as 
large as possible, without concerning itself with (nor being able to determine) how the pie is split.31 
This on-going discussion and the implicit acceptance of the higher relevance of the economic analysis 
of law as a powerful methodology where redistribution (or broader soft public policy goals) is not the 
primary concern for legal intervention has had an impact in determining the areas of law where 
economic analysis has been more developed, which mainly concentrate around commercial law and 
private law broadly speaking. As clearly summed up,  
Today, economic thinking dominates contract, commercial, bankruptcy, antitrust, corporate, 
and securities law and related fields. It is also influential if not dominant in tort, criminal, and 
property law and civil procedure. It has made less progress in the major fields of public law, 
including constitutional, immigration, administrative, and international law. These areas of 
law are less closely connected with commercial behavior than most of the others, and so the 
off-the-shelf economic models do not as clearly apply to them. Economists have produced a 
large political economy literature, but the models in this literature are more controversial and 
less usable than models of commercial behavior.32 
This does not mean that economic analysis of law is necessarily limited to private and commercial 
law, but it is a fact that these are the fields where its insights may be more powerful and less 
controversial. Thus, the remainder of the discussion will start by exploring them, and then proceed to 
other areas of application of the economic analysis of law. 
The origins of law and economics and its focus on transaction costs 
One of the areas where the insights of economic analysis of law are clearly consolidated (and 
relatively uncontroversial) concerns the analysis surrounding the concept of transaction costs,33 and 
the related Coase theorem.34 Transaction costs are those linked to a given transfer of assets that are 
                                                          
31 For discussion and a different view, see Lucian A Bebchuck, ‘The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone 
Expect a Bigger Slice?’ (1980) 8(3) Hofstra Law Review 671-709. 
32 Eric A Posner, in Baird (n 11). 
33 Oliver E Williamson and Scott E Masten (eds), The Economics of Transaction Costs (Edward Elgar, 1999). 
34 Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-44. 
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necessary for a legal exchange to take place, such as information costs, negotiation costs, enforcement 
costs, etc. In simplified terms, the analysis based on transaction costs that leads to the Coase theorem 
indicates that, in the absence of transaction costs (or where they are sufficiently low) assets will be 
traded in a way that ensures their optimal final allocation (i.e., regardless of any initial allocation of 
assets, they will be put to their best possible social use). Conversely, where transaction costs are high, 
economic transactions that would otherwise be efficient will not take place, which causes a loss of 
(potential) social welfare.35  
The classical example to illustrate the Coase theorem concerns situations where allowing party A to 
carry out an activity damages party B, while preventing damage to party B necessarily causes a 
detriment to part A. For instance, let’s think of a situation where party A runs a private school and 
party B runs a music studio.36 The school and the music studio are adjacent, so parties A and B are 
neighbours. Until now, the music studio was only open in the evenings, while the school finished 
classes in the early afternoon. Thus, until now, the school and the music studio could both develop 
their activities unaffected by each other. Imagine that the music studio, in view of increased demand 
for its services, considers opening all day. If that happens, the school will probably be affected 
because the noise coming from the studio will distract pupils during their classes.37 In abstract terms, 
there are two possible legal rules or models: under option 1, the school is legally responsible to 
provide a proper (quiet) learning environment to its pupils and, if that is not the case, it must pay the 
costs to make the situation good or stop its activities altogether. Differently, under option 2, the music 
studio is responsible for avoiding noise and nuisance to its neighbours, and it is liable to pay damages 
                                                          
35 This is ultimately linked to the problem of market failure. See Francis M Bator, ‘The Anatomy of Market 
Failure’ (1958) 72(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 351-379. Market failure is one of the main justifications 
for regulatory intervention. However, any such intervention is affected by potential problems of government 
failure; see Jonathan J Pincus, ‘Market Failure and Government Failure’ in S King and P Lloyd (eds), Economic 
Rationalism: Dead End or Way Forward (Allen & Unwin, 1993) 261-276. 
36 The qualification that the school is private aims to avoid issues concerning the social value of education, 
which is certainly difficult to measure. It is generally more accessible (and less controversial) to solely focus on 
the financial benefits of running a school as a business. This is not intended to pre-empt any other discussion. 
For some thoughts on the difficulties in measuring the value of public goods, see David S Brookshire and Don L 
Coursey, ‘Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures’ (1987) 
77(4) The American Economic Review 554-566. 
37 The converse example could be constructed assuming the school intends to offer out-of-hours sports activities 
and the music studio is concerned that the background noise will disturb its clients or diminish the quality of the 
musical recordings, so the example is not intended to point towards any specific outcome. 
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if it breaches that obligation. Under rule 1, the school has no possibility to sue the music studio, and 
its only option to avoid discontinuing its activities due to noise is to invest in soundproofing the 
school. Under rule 2, the music studio is the one having to invest in soundproofing its premises, least 
it wants to be open to claims for damages. 
An approach to this problem under other research methodologies would probably focus on whether it 
would be fair for the music studio to take advantage from extended noise hours at the expense of the 
school, or whether favouring one activity over the other creates the type of social effect that is 
considered desirable under the relevant normative framework (such as the promotion of regulated 
school education or the expansion of space for unregulated liberal arts). Differently, under the 
methodology of economic analysis of law, and in particular under transaction cost analysis, the Coase 
theorem aims at solving the problem by identifying which solution is more efficient. To understand 
the insights of this analysis, we need some additional information. Imagine that the private school 
obtains a profit of £500,000 a year and that it would cost it £100,000 per year to soundproof its 
premises. In turn, the music studio could increase its annual profit by £250,000 if it extended its 
opening hours beyond evenings (the current level of turnover of the studio not being relevant), and the 
cost of soundproofing its premises would be of £200,000 per year. Alternatively, the music studio 
could risk having to pay damages to the school, which would be of £300,000 a year. Under rule 1, the 
school would clearly decide to invest in soundproofing rather than closing down altogether (hence 
keeping a profit of £400,000 per year). Similarly, under rule 2, the music studio would rather 
soundproof its premises and extend its opening hours than keeping its activity limited to the evenings 
(thus obtaining an additional benefit of £50,000) or being exposed to damages claims (thus incurring 
losses of £50,000). Apparently, then, rule 1 is more efficient than rule 2. This derives basically from 
the fact that the cost of the remedial measure is lower for the school than for the music studio. 
However, and this is the crucial contribution of the Coase theorem, both rules 1 and 2 are inferior to 
the solution that parties A and B could reach if they are allowed to cooperate.38 
                                                          
38 We are not concerned here with the analysis of whether cooperation would actually take place, which would 
be something to assess under game theory, which is briefly discussed below. 
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In a scenario of possible cooperation (that is, where there are no, or only very low transaction costs), 
when the music studio considers the possibility of extending its hours, it could ask the school to 
provide an estimate of its soundproofing costs. When the music studio realised that it was cheaper for 
the school to take those measures than for itself, it would be rational for the music studio to ask the 
school to soundproof and to offer to cover the costs, which would allow for a saving of £100,000 per 
year in soundproofing costs. It would be equally rational for the school to point out that the music 
studio should compensate the school for its collaboration, so that they should split the savings equally. 
The end result would then be that the school would take the soundproofing measures and the music 
studio would pay it £150,000, thus leaving both parties better off (the school would have a total 
annual profit of £550,000 and the music studio would increase its annual profits by £100,000). The 
collaborative solution is superior because both parties are better off than under any other solution. 
What this indicates is that, where collaboration is possible, the initial allocation of rights (that is, 
whether rule 1 or rule 2 controls, or whether the music studio has the right to create noise or the 
school has the right to a quiet environment) is not relevant and an efficient outcome will be achieved 
regardless. However, this does not resemble reality because transaction costs are far from zero and 
because the set of circumstances we have depicted are unrealistic. On the contrary, where 
collaboration is not possible because transaction costs are sufficiently high (e.g., the cost of 
negotiating a contract between the school and the music studio exceeds the value of the savings 
derived from collaboration), the initial allocation of rights is very relevant to the possibility of 
achieving an efficient outcome and any legal rule devised to adjudicate on disputes runs the risk of 
being inferior to the collaborative solution that could otherwise emerge. 
The insights that derive from this type of analysis are plentiful, but the most obvious ones are that, 
when designing legal rules, a clear focus should be on the minimisation of transaction costs, so as to 
facilitate collaborative solutions that can increase the efficient use of the resources. Further, that in the 
design of legal rules, the most efficient solutions can be achieved if costs are imposed on the party 
that can avoid them more efficiently (cheapest cost avoider), even if it is not the obvious party on 
which to impose a cost from a different perspective (for instance, under fairness or distributive justice 
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considerations). Of course, all these insights result in the need to carry out additional (and 
increasingly complex) analyses (for instance, to determine who is the cheapest cost avoider in a 
specific situation, or which rule will tend to impose the risk on the class of agents that are generally 
the cheapest cost avoiders, and so on) and be sure that all relevant circumstances are taken into 
account (e.g., are there third parties affected by the noise coming from the studio other than the 
school?).39 The work of legal researcher thus starts with an examination of the rules applicable to the 
case (does the school have a right to silence? are the requirements for a claim, e.g. in tort, met? is 
there a general obligation to minimise losses before claiming compensation, or a duty to cooperate 
with the tortfeasor in minimising the costs of the activity creating the nuisance? etc), including the 
way they are interpreted and applied by the courts, and then turns towards a consideration of whether 
these rules are efficient as a final critical assessment potentially leading to proposals for legal reform.  
The extension of the economic analysis of law beyond private law: crimes and sanctions 
Beyond the area of private law disputes, the economic analysis of law can also provide useful insights 
in areas such as criminal law or branches of administrative law that deal with sanctions and fines. In 
these areas, the concept of deterrence is fundamental in order to get the level of sanctions and the 
amount of effort put into policing crimes and violations right (or, more realistically, to promote legal 
reforms that tend towards the optimal level of deterrence). Analysis of these issues under other 
methodologies can often face difficulties such as assuming that all crimes can be deterred (which is 
not a truly workable assumption, if nothing else, due to the prohibitive costs it would entail in terms 
of policing), or lacking indications as to the appropriate level of criminal and administrative sanctions 
in view of the (im)moral nature or general undesirability of specific types of behaviour. The economic 
analysis of law as applied to this area provides some insights that can be useful on both fronts. On the 
first aspect, it stresses a certain degree of substitution between investing more resources in deterrence 
and raising the level of the sanctions. However, it also makes it clear that both issues (in particular 
increasing the level of sanctions) are subjected to decreasing marginal gains and, consequently, at 
                                                          
39 For discussion, see Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128. Please bear in mind that 
their contribution has not, however, been uncontroversial. 
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some point both further investments in deterrence capacity and further increases of the applicable 
sanctions can be ineffective, or even counter-productive. A useful example can be found in the 
Singaporean ban on the importation and sale of chewing gum. The punishment for illegal gum 
trafficking was never corporal, but even for a first offence it can include a fine of up to S$100,000 
(£51,000 or €65,000 approx.) and up to two years in prison.40 Imagine that this measure proved 
insufficient to completely prevent damages derived from improper chewing gum disposal in the 
Singapore underground (which was the original goal of the ban) and the Singaporean government 
decided to attach corporal punishment, or even the death sentence for gum traffickers. Would that be a 
measure susceptible of creating further deterrence, or would it actually undermine the effectiveness of 
the ban as a whole? That is the sort of thing that can be assessed under general deterrence theory. On 
the second issue, concerned with the appropriate level of sanctions, by developing an economic theory 
of crime, law and economics can also provide some indicators as to how to set the sanctions at a level 
that is efficient (this can, for instance, be useful in terms of choosing whether a given behaviour 
should constitute an administrative offence liable to the imposition of a fine, or rather be a criminal 
offence that can carry an imprisonment sentence or some other sort of non-monetary sanction). 
Even if it seems counterintuitive at first sight, the economic analysis of law applied to these areas 
contributes important insights through a theory of rational crime, whereby the incentives and 
disincentives for the commission of crimes are treated in a way relatively similar with those for the 
engagement in preventative or corrective measures discussed above. Under this conceptualisation, it is 
expected that people will commit crimes whenever they expect to gain from them or, maybe in more 
accurate terms, when the expected sanction is insufficient to deter them from committing those 
crimes. A relatively straightforward insight is that the expected sanction for the commission of a 
given offence is the combined result of the probability of being caught (and convicted) for the offence 
                                                          
40 See Leo Benedictus, ‘Gum control: how Lee Kuan Yew kept chewing gum off Singapore's streets’, The 
Guardian, 23 March 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2015/mar/23/gum-
control-how-lee-kuan-yew-kept-chewing-gum-off-singapores-streets (last accessed 20 June 2016). 
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and of the level or seriousness of the sanction.41 Thus, it is possible to establish the pay-off that the 
potential offender would consider in terms that function as prices. 
Examples of this are particularly clear if we consider economic offences that are commonly 
committed as the result of a rational process, such as tax evasion42 (although the theory applies 
equally to other crimes and offences). Under this approach, in order to deter the potential offender, it 
is necessary for the expected sanction to be larger than the expected gain from committing the 
offence. Imagine an individual subjected to the highest taxation bracket of 40% currently applicable in 
the UK, who decides to under-report its income by £10,000. This would lead to an immediate saving 
of £4,000 in evaded taxes. Imagine that the applicable sanction for that amount of tax evasion was 
£10,000. The question at this point would be why would she decide to under-report her income, in 
particular given that the sanction for that behaviour is nominally higher than the amount it plans to 
evade (in terms of evaded taxes, and equal to the amount of income she plans to under-report). 
However, maybe counterintuitively, the economic analysis of law demonstrates that this situation 
would still not ensure deterrence of the under-reporting because not all instances of tax evasion get 
identified, investigated and successfully sanctioned. Imagine that the tax inspectorate (HMRC) has a 
probability of sanction of 12% of this type of tax evasion (for instance, because this type of case ranks 
low in its enforcement priorities, which lead it to concentrate on corporate tax evasion). Then, the 
expected sanction is the result of multiplying the probability of being sanctioned times the applicable 
sanction, which means that the expected sanction is actually of £1,200 (that is the amount of the fine 
£10,000 multiplied by the probability of being caught and sanctioned, which is 12% or 0.12), and falls 
well below the level needed in deterrence terms. And this is so despite it implying that, in case of 
being imposed, the £10,000 sanction would represent 2.5 times the evaded taxes (of £4,000) and 
100% of the under-reported income (of £10,000), which would ensure that the tax evader keeps no 
economic advantage whatsoever.  
                                                          
41 For in-depth discussion, see Gary S Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76(2) 
Journal of Political Economy 169-217; and Stigler (n 21). 
42 See Maurice Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’ (1972) 1(4) 
Journal of Public Economics 323-338; and in-depth discussion in Joel Slemrod, ‘Cheating Ourselves: The 
Economics of Tax Evasion’ (2007) 21(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 25-48. 
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It is important to note that this is the case because the pay-off of the potential offender would be 
positive. With a probability of 88% (that is, the reverse of the 12% probability of being sanctioned), 
she gets to keep the £4,000 in evaded taxes. Taking into account both the benefits of avoiding taxes if 
not caught and the cost of the fine if caught, this means that her expected pay-off is: 0.88 x £4,000 – 
0.12 x £10,000 = £2,320. These calculations still may need to be subjected to adjustments in order to 
incorporate the potential offender’s approach to risk. Risk averse people will tend to over-estimate the 
probability of being caught (in the example, if she perceives the probability of being sanctioned to be 
any higher than 40%, then she is deterred because at that point her expected pay-off becomes 
negative), whereas risk prone people will do the opposite.43 In any case, though, being able to at least 
assess the risk neutral case already provides interesting insights—since, otherwise, it could have been 
quite intuitive to assume that a sanction of £10,000 for the evasion of £4,000 in taxes or £10,000 in 
taxable income was actually sufficient for deterrence purposes. 
Beyond this descriptive power, which can help explain difficult issues such as the perceived 
ineffectiveness of existing sanctions to deter specific types of behaviour that are considered 
undesirable (such as tax evasion), the economic analysis of law can also help in normative aspects, 
such as whether to criminalise a given activity that could otherwise be considered a mere 
administrative offence (which is clearly relevant in terms of the design of public policy around 
controversial areas such as drug dealing,44 or prostitution45). The approach under this methodology 
will usually help structure a cost/benefit analysis46 of the different options available—which is 
ultimately oriented towards identifying the option that, on the whole or in net terms, creates the 
largest surplus or the smallest shortfall—and, more often than not, will allow the researcher to 
                                                          
43 Developing the example to capture all the complexities that a full formulation of the economic theory of 
crime has developed would exceed the possibilities of our discussion. The interested reader can follow the 
discussion in Cooter and Ulen (n 8) chapters 11 and 12, and Shavell (n 8) chapters 20 to 24. 
44 Sylvaine Poret, ‘Paradoxical Effects of Law Enforcement Policies: The Case of the Illicit Drug Market’ 
(2002) 22(4) International Review of Law and Economics 465-493. For a related analysis of the economics of 
drug dealing, see Steven D Levitt and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, ‘An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling 
Gang's Finances’ (2000) 115(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 755-789. 
45 Rocio Albert, Fernando Gomez and Yanna Gutierrez Franco, Regulating Prostitution: A Comparative Law 
and Economics Approach (2007) FEDEA Working Papers No 2007-30, available at 
http://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/dt/2007/dt-2007-30.pdf (last accessed 26 May 2016). 
46 See Sukhamoy Chakravarty, ‘Cost–benefit analysis’, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman 
(eds), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1st edn (1987) 1889-1897. 
18 
question received wisdom about whether society is better off by following a course of action over the 
other.  
Reaching out to the public law sphere: institutional agency theory and beyond 
Together with criminal law, another area beyond private law where economic analysis can offer 
interesting insights concerns some aspects of public law.47 Some specific applications of economic 
theory are well developed and increasingly used in this realm, such as regulatory capture theory.48 
Specifically, I find agency theory particularly useful to inform legal issues such as public governance 
and the management of public resources.49 Agency theory conceptualises the relationships that arise 
when one person or entity (agent) is able to make decisions on behalf of, or that impact, another 
person or entity (principal).50 The main insight of agency theory is that agency relationships imply an 
unavoidable risk of conflict of interest because the agent will (always/sometimes) have an incentive to 
deviate from the behaviour expected by the principal and further its own self-interest. This creates the 
need for the principal to monitor the agent (which is costly) and the possibility for both parties to 
reduce the risk of strategic behaviour through (mutual) commitments (involving signalling and 
bonding, which are also costly), as well as tailor-made systems of incentives whereby both sets of 
interests can be aligned. The most well-known application of agency theory is perhaps in the field of 
corporate law and governance, where agency theory has been used to conceptualise and regulate the 
relationship between the owners (shareholders) and managers (directors) of commercial firms.51 
                                                          
47 Wolfgang Weigel, ‘Why Promote the Economic Analysis of Public Law?’ (2006) 23(2) Homo Oeconomicus 
195-216. 
48 This strand of theory has multiple facets, from some closely linked to agency theory, to others conceptualising 
the problems in terms of rent extraction. For two excellent examples, one in each line of enquiry, see Jean-
Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory 
Capture’ (1991) 106(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1089-1127; and Fred S McChesney, Money for 
Nothing. Politicians, Rent Extraction and Political Extortion (Harvard University Press, 1997). 
49 The commonly accepted initial full formulation of the agency theory was by Michael C Jensen and William H 
Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal 
of Financial Economics 305-360. In the public law area, institutional agency theory has been significantly 
influenced by the work of Barry M Mitnick, The political economy of regulation: Creating, designing, and 
removing regulatory forms (Columbia University Press, 1980). 
50 Kathleen M Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’ (1989) 14(1) The Academy of 
Management Review 57-74; Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Principal and agent (II)’, in Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E 
Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn (2008). 
51 Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law and 
Economics 301-325. 
19 
Agency theory is also very helpful in understanding and designing rules aimed, for example, at 
controlling the way in which decisions are adopted by politicians or civil servants. The general theory 
concerned with these issues is known as public choice,52 and it is a fundamental area of law and 
economics, as well as public policy studies.53 One of its core insights—which has been developed to 
many areas of political and public administration activity54—is that when politicians or civil servants 
make decisions for which they have received a democratic mandate or been invested with public 
powers, they will have incentives to act in a way that benefits them (personally) rather than in a way 
that furthers the public interest. This is clear concerning politicians, who will be tempted to act based 
on their assessment of the path of action that can lead them to re-election (populism), or that can 
provide them with more immediate personal gains (such as engaging in outright bribery, or rent-
seeking behaviour e.g. by trying to obtain appointments to well-remunerated private positions after 
they step down from office, thus creating problems of revolving doors). It is also clear regarding civil 
servants, which may also be tempted by personal gain or decide to engage in policy-making that 
increases their portfolio of influence or power, or that maximises their budget or the size of their 
operations within the public sector.55 All of them may also be tempted to slack and avoid making any 
decisions that can prove unpopular, which is only going to create further problems down the line. 
These insights can be usefully exploited under public choice theory and serve the basis of systems of 
checks and balances, including liability rules, so as to overcome issues derived from the agency 
problem in the sphere of public governance. 
                                                          
52 The seminal work developing the theory is generally understood to be James M Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan 
Press, 1962), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3.html (last accessed 20 June 2016). 
53 See B Guy Peters, Advanced Introduction to Public Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 39 and ff. 
54 See Dennis C Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Michael Reksulak, Laura 
Razzolini and William F Shughart II (eds), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2nd edn (Edward Elgar, 
2013). See also John Cullis and Philip Jones, Public Finance and Public Choice. Analytical Perspectives, 3rd 
edn (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
55 P Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Economic Approaches in Political (Pearson, 1991; 
repr. Routledge, 2013). 
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It’s not all fun and games, or is it? 
A discussion on economic analysis of law, however brief and superficial, cannot end without at least 
having made a reference to game theory,56 which is another of the main areas of study of law from an 
economic perspective. In simplified terms, game theory aims to formalise (or create mathematical 
models) to study the interaction between decision-makers and to predict the potential outcomes of 
situations where the relevant parties need to make decisions on the basis of their expectations or 
(limited) knowledge of the behaviour of the other party.57 The most well-known instance of the type 
of analysis carried out by game theory is the so-called prisoner’s dilemma, which conceptualises the 
incentives for two parties that can either cooperate to their mutual advantage or try to cheat each other 
to obtain a larger individual advantage, with the constraint that engaging in conflict rather than 
cooperation makes both parties worse off.  
In the standard textbook example, two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned in 
solitary confinement, with no means of communicating with each other. The prosecutors lack 
sufficient evidence to convict them for the commission of specific serious crimes (which would carry 
a sentence of 20 years in prison), but they are confident that they can convict both of them for their 
membership of the criminal gang (which is a less serious offence and carries a sentence of 1 year in 
prison). In order to try to obtain additional evidence from the suspects, simultaneously, the 
prosecutors offer each prisoner the possibility to strike a deal if they betray the other by testifying of 
the major crimes committed by the other prisoner. The conditions of the offer are as follows: if only 
one of them betrays the other, the one that confesses will be released, whereas the betrayed prisoner 
will be convicted for the major crime. However, if both confess, they will be jointly convicted for the 
more serious crimes, albeit their sentences will be reduced to reflect their cooperation with the 
investigation, which will result in both of them serving jail sentences of 5 years. If neither of them 
confesses they will only be convicted for the less serious crime – 1 year. It seems clear that both 
                                                          
56 John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton 
University Press, 1944). 
57 Or, in more formal terms, game theory is ‘the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation 
between intelligent rational decision-makers’; Roger B Myerson, Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict (Harvard 
University Press, 1991) 1. 
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prisoners have an incentive to cooperate because, if they both remain silent, they are collectively 
better off. 
  Prisoner 2 








Confess 5 , 5 0 , 20 
Remain silent 20 , 0 1 , 1 
 
However, game theory demonstrates that it would be irrational for both prisoners, acting on individual 
basis, to remain silent because, by doing so, they risk being cheated by the other prisoner and ending 
up serving the longer sentence. Thus, not knowing what the other prisoner will do, remaining silent is 
risky because it leaves one open to being cheated and carries a possibility of serving 20 years in 
prison. On the contrary, confessing guarantees to the prisoner a maximum sentence of 5 years and the 
possibility to be let go, which seems a preferable situation. Thus, both prisoners, anticipating that the 
other one will cheat, will both confess and end up serving a 5 year sentence each. Of course, all of this 
analysis relies on the impossibility for the prisoners to communicate and cooperate. If cooperation 
was possible, then we would need to carry out additional assessments concerning the cost of their 
cooperation, similarly to what we did in the discussion of the Coase theorem above. Where 
cooperation is structurally impossible or very difficult to operationalise within a legal framework, it is 
common to refer to the situation as the tragedy of the commons.58 
Game theory can tackle much more complex situations of interaction in decision-making than the one 
discussed in the streamlined scenario of the prisoners’ dilemma and is very useful in setting up rules 
that lead to desired behaviour (such as confessions or collaboration with law enforcement bodies, but 
also in order to design default legal rules that ensure efficient outcomes when the parties cannot 
cooperate or coordinate behaviour by themselves), or in assessing the complications in the formation 
                                                          
58 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
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of contracts or the entry into international treaties, amongst a myriad of other uses. Therefore, this is 
another way in which the economic analysis of law can be useful as an analytical tool.59 
Possible applications to research the topic of ‘lay decision-making in the legal system’ 
After this general discussion of some of the ways in which economic analysis can assist in the 
analysis of legal institutions and legal decision-making—which are certainly relevant in all areas of 
law adjudication, regardless of the level of legal training of the decision-maker—it is now time to 
focus, even if briefly, on the more specific issue of the ways in which this methodology can be 
applied to the particular topic of ‘lay decision-making in the legal system’. For a researcher willing to 
tackle research questions in this area, this would certainly not be uncharted territory and previous 
work on juries and their efficiency would necessarily be the point of departure.60 This line of enquiry 
under a ‘classic’ law and economics approach incorporates insights from different more specific 
methods, such as transaction cost analysis or game theory, and focuses on questions such as the 
optimal make-up of the jury and its size (which creates trade-offs between the quality of the fact 
finding and the workability of the arrangement), the economics of the decision whether to seek a jury 
trial over a bench trial (which can be understood as part of a game ultimately leading the parties to 
settle out of court, whenever possible),61 the rule that should apply to jury decision-making (unanimity 
v majority, or qualified majority, etc), or whether jury duty should be mandatory or not.62 More recent 
studies have started to analyse more specific issues, such as the rules allowing lawyers to veto 
potential jury members.63 However, this is an area where behavioural law and economics is making 
increasingly relevant strides,64 and the researcher may be more interested in that perspective due to the 
closer links with other socio-legal approaches to the study of law decision-making in the legal 
                                                          
59 Douglas G Baird, Robert H Gertner & Randall C Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard University 
Press, 1998). 
60 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (n 8) chapters 21 and 22, with further references. 
61 Joni Hersch, ‘Demand for a Jury Trial and the Selection of Cases for Trial’ (2006) 35(1) Journal of Legal 
Studies 119-142. 
62 Donald L Martin, ‘The Economics of Jury Conscription’ (1972) 80(4) Journal of Political Economy 680-702. 
63 Francis X Flanagan, ‘Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection’ (2015) 58(2) Journal of Law & Economics 
385-416. 
64 For a first approximation to that literature, see Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith and Terrence Chorvat, ‘Lessons 
from Neuroeconomics for the Law’, in Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith (eds), The Law and Economics of 
Irrational Behavior (Stanford University Press, 2005) 85-86. 
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system.65 Given the focus of this chapter on ‘classical’ economic analysis of law methodology, this 
issue is not discussed in any further detail. 
Some final thoughts – what do I mean by ‘economically-informed’ legal research then? 
After this quick overview of some of the main applications of the economic analysis of law, it may be 
worth stressing its relevance for legal research at a postgraduate or advanced level. As mentioned 
above, I am convinced that carrying out legal research without assessing its economic implications 
and without incorporating the insights of economic theory is ultimately unsatisfactory, and that legal 
research should be economically-informed. What I mean by the need to carry out ‘economically-
informed’ legal research is that researchers, even if they do not directly engage with economic 
methods and theories as a core component of their projects, should at least incorporate the insights 
resulting from previous economic analysis in the relevant research area. That incorporation should at 
least be by way of discussion, if nothing else, to justify the adoption of a different normative 
framework or of an approach that may challenge the insights offered by the economic analysis of law, 
or to offer some rationale as to why economic implications can be neglected in the context of a given 
research project. This is particularly relevant in areas of law with a clear economic component, such 
as economic regulation, commercial litigation, securities and finance, etc. But it is also relevant in any 
other area of the law, however apparently remote from economic considerations, such as family law,66 
and even if the main methodology chosen for a specific project is different than law and economics, 
such as comparative law.67 
This may be seen as an attempt on my part to support the imperialism of the economic analysis of 
law.68 However, I would rather approach this from the opposite perspective and stress the perils of 
                                                          
65 See the rest of the contributions to this book. 
66 See e.g. Margaret F Brinig (ed), Economics of Family Law (Edward Elgar, 2007) and Antony W Dnes and 
Robert Rowthorn (eds), The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
67 See Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (University of Michigan Press, 1999); Mathias Reimann, 
‘Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of Law’, in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 839-864; and the contributions to 
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68 The issue is not at all new. See Robert D Cooter, ‘Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to 
the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books’ (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 1260-1269 
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carrying out legal research and engage in legal decision-making in an ‘economically-disinformed’ 
manner—not to say, ‘economically-ignorant’ way. It seems plainly obvious to me that legal decision-
making has immediate and unavoidable economic effects,69 and that failing to understand those 
effects and incorporate them into the decision-making process and/or the process of legal research is 
bound to result in faulty outcomes or theories and insights that cannot translate into reality in a 
desirable way.70 Therefore, the least that legal research should do from this perspective is to ensure 
that it is economically-congruous and that its insights can be related to economic reality and economic 
theory—even if the main purpose of the research is to criticise them, show any shortcomings, or 
advocate the adoption of a different paradigm. Otherwise, there is a clear risk of pushing for legal 
reforms or reaching adjudicative decisions that can be detrimental to social welfare in the long-run. 
To me, this is normatively undesirable. At the risk of accusations of circularity of my arguments, then, 
I consider all non-economically-informed legal research faulty—which, again, is not to say that all 
researchers necessarily must follow a law and economics methodology, but to stress that all 
researchers need to engage in an intellectual dialogue with the economic analysis of law. 
                                                          
69 This is clearly recognised in the area of regulatory impact assessment, and should be uncontroversial. See 
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Impact Assessment’, in 
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